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1INTRODUCTION
“As if the problems in the U.S. and world economies were not enough 
of a challenge in themselves, the … Obama administration is also 
being called on to figure out simultaneously how to govern in such an 
emergency.”
— David Broder, The Washington Post, March 9, 2009.
We are in the midst of a global economic crisis. The federal government 
has responded on an unprecedented scale and scope, with injections of 
trillions into financial markets, infusions of cash to troubled industries, state 
and local governments, and people in need. Government is employing 
tools in ways never before considered and inventing new tools, in the 
hope of stabilizing the economy and spurring economic recovery. 
As difficult as it is to predict whether these efforts will be successful with 
regard to economic goals, there are other potential implications that have 
yet to be thought through. Government’s response could affect our gover-
nance structure and relationships in ways that are not fully understood. 
Because of the magnitude of the economic crisis and the extraordinary 
efforts to respond, industries, markets and government will function 
very differently in the near term and perhaps far into the future. 
Will institutions being created to manage trillions of dollars in recovery 
funds linger long—or too long—after the crisis recedes? How will the 
challenges of changing demographics of an aging population and unfunded 
long-term government commitments to Social Security and Medicare 
benefits be addressed? Will the American people have a different relation-
ship with their government and private enterprise when the crisis is over? 
How will the decisions being made today affect the roles, responsibilities, 
functions, laws, regulations and management of government? Simply put, 
how will basic governance in our democracy be changed by these events?
Now is the time to ensure that we are asking the right questions as 
we move forward in this uncharted territory. A timely and critical focus 
on these issues could be an important guide for our mid-term actions, 
prevent us from sliding into negative long-term economic consequences, 
and prepare us to make changes in governance structures that will 
address our new circumstances. Now is the time for a public discussion 
of governance.
 
Under the leadership of National Academy Fellow Don Kettl and 
National Academy President Jennifer Dorn, the National Academy of 
Public Administration convened a roundtable of government leaders, 
business leaders, researchers and other experts to discuss governance 
issues related to the government’s response to the financial crisis. Seven 
strategic questions related to governance emerged from the discussion 
held earlier this year, which was moderated by Don Kettl. The National 
Academy and the IBM Center for The Business of Government are 
pleased to offer this summary of the roundtable in an effort to stimulate 
a national discussion of these questions. 
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Participants in NAPA Roundtable 
on American Governance
Mark A. Abramson, Leadership Inc. 
Sarah A. Binder, Brookings Institution
David Broder, The Washington Post
Frank C. Carlucci, The Carlyle Group
Jenna L. Dorn, National Academy of Public Administration
Robert D. Ebel, District of Columbia Government
H. George Frederickson, University of Kansas
Michael P. Jackson, Firebreak Partners, LLC
Elaine C. Kamarck, Harvard University 
Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institution
Donald F. Kettl, University of Maryland
John A. Koskinen, Freddie Mac
J. Christopher Mihm, Government Accountability Office
Paul H. O’Neill, former Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury
Sallyanne Payton, University of Michigan 
Egbert L. J. Perry, Integral Group, LLC
Alex J. Pollock, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research
Thomas H. Stanton, John Hopkins University 
Robert M. Tobias, American University
David M. Walker, Peter G. Peterson Foundation
3QUESTIONS
Question One: 
How should the terms of the social contract 
among government, business, civil society 
and the American people be redefined?
“The financial meltdown has accelerated our expectations that govern-
ment will keep us safe.… We’re writing this new social contract with 
three guides: more public money in the private economy, more rules to 
shape how the private sector behaves, and more citizen expectations 
that government will manage the risks we face. The problem? We’re 
making it up as we go along, and we’re not sure where we’re going.”
— Donald F. Kettl, Government Executive, February 2009
With deference to Locke, Rousseau and other political theorists, the 
American “social contract” has its roots in the Preamble to the Constitution, 
which declares that “we the people ... in order to form a more perfect 
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the com-
mon defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” Today, the term has evolved to 
connote the full array of social arrangements that shape the economy 
and establish the roles of government, business, non-profit organiza-
tions, families and individuals in defining and providing necessities in 
American life—from education to retirement income to health care. 
The current American social contract is rooted in the New Deal, when 
“workers, employers and the government entered into an implied 
social contract that afforded Americans a basic level of economic 
security if they worked hard and took responsibility for their families.”* 
The evolution of employer-based health insurance, the creation of 
Medicare and subsequent addition of prescription drug benefits, and 
the establishment of home mortgage deductions, 401(K)s and student 
loans gradually expanded the social “safety net.” But, with decades 
of generally low unemployment, rising home values, high investment 
returns and easy credit, discussion of wholesale changes to the social 
contract in America was largely set aside.
Now, with personal retirement savings reduced by the financial 
downturn, a clear and growing gap between the dedicated revenue 
and promised benefits from Social Security and Medicare, and health 
care costs that are increasing twice as fast as the economy, there is an 
increasing call for forthright discussion of the rights, roles and respon-
sibilities of citizens, businesses and government. As one Roundtable 
participant observed, “Rescuing banks, mortgage brokers, automak-
ers and home buyers implies moral hazards in federal ownership or 
part ownership ... but the equity question arises when we privatize 
economic gain and federalize risk and loss.” Add to this a general 
acknowledgement that we are, as a nation, living beyond our means 
and leaving unreasonable bills for coming generations to pay. 
There are now two fundamental questions for Americans to grapple 
with as we “renegotiate” our social contract: (1) Who should bear 
risk in our society, and (2) how should we balance the books between 
generations of Americans?
* Judith Rodin, “The New Social Contract,” Time, July 17, 2008.
4QUESTIONS
Question Two: 
What is the new global role for the United 
States in the wake of the economic crisis?
“World trade is declining, the effects of which will become clear in 
the next 10 years. Will federal institutions have to give way to global 
institutions?”
— Roundtable Participant
The economic crisis has tarnished the political oversight and economic 
institutions of the United States, and dealt a significant blow to the 
U.S. economy. It has also caused international observers to question 
whether a U.S.-dominated global financial system is appropriate. 
The international economic leadership role long-played by the United 
States may yield to a more collaborative approach. 
Much of the debate about a new role for the United States globally is 
predicated on the assumption that the financial crisis will so reduce 
the economic power of the United States and so discredit its institu-
tions that a redefined role will be necessary. Some are calling for the 
internationalization of the global public financial regulatory system. 
Others are pressing for a greater role for international organizations in 
mitigating not only financial crises, but political and social problems, 
as well. 
It can be argued, however, that because the economic crisis has 
reached international proportions, the power of the United States is 
not likely to erode significantly. Further, some say, the reforms under-
taken in the U.S. as a result of the crisis may mean that the country 
will emerge from it economically stronger. 
Nevertheless, the prospect of any lessening or redirection of U.S. 
economic influence raises numerous issues for the U.S. and for the 
rest of the world. Which country or countries will emerge as world 
economic leaders? How will these emerging economic powers exercise 
their influence in world financial institutions? How should the U.S. 
respond? What roles and responsibilities should the U.S. be prepared 
to assume in the world community? 
Should America reconsider or redefine its global economic leader-




What structural changes in the financial 
system should be made to foresee, prevent, 
and respond to future economic crises?
“Did we not know enough about what was going on because of lack of 
capability? Or did we know all along, but political forces prevented us 
from acting?”
— Roundtable Participant
The federal institutions charged with regulating the financial system 
and managing the economy failed to anticipate and prevent the financial 
crisis. Some argue that the government’s regulatory system may have 
contributed to the crisis. 
Yet controversy about financial system regulation remains high, and 
agreement on systems to foresee and prevent future problems will 
likely be difficult to achieve. Indeed, there is little consensus about 
whether more regulation is the answer. There remain two basic 
schools of thought:
•	 Financial markets are essentially self-regulating, and will right 
themselves eventually, if not hindered by government regulation.
•	 Financial markets are subject to a number of failures that threaten 
their effective and equitable operation, and that can only be 
addressed through government regulation.
Those in the first camp argue that government regulation and policies 
contributed to the financial crisis by creating perverse incentives. They 
reject calls for additional regulation on the grounds that it will dampen 
investment, innovation and economic growth.
Even proponents of regulation, however, disagree about exactly why 
the system failed and what changes ought to be made. Most agree 
that the regulatory institutions, created largely during the New Deal, 
are far too fragmented, with authority shared among the federal and 
state governments and among multiple federal entities. Whether they 
are also underfunded, understaffed or too limited in their scope is 
the subject of intense debate. Proposed changes include a greater 
regulatory role for international bodies and more cooperation among 
regulatory bodies in countries with a strong financial presence in the 
global economy. Regardless of what steps are taken, many question 
the prudence of undertaking major regulatory system reforms in the 
midst of the financial crisis.
In addition to regulatory policy, the roles of the Federal Reserve Bank, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Department of the 
Treasury in managing the economy have been questioned. It is widely 
believed that these institutions collectively failed to anticipate the 
crisis, likely contributed to it, and lacked a coherent response strategy. 
How can we strengthen the nation’s financial management and regula-
tory institutions and improve our ability to diagnosis and provide early 
warning about potential problems?
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Question Four:
What should be done to improve 
Congressional oversight and expertise?
“There has been a decrease in [Congressional] oversight hearings and 
an increase in ‘fire site” hearings.... Congress has to go back to work 
and make its oversight capacity more constructive. Congress must 
modernize itself.”
—Roundtable  Participant
Much has been written about the apparent lack of Congressional 
foresight and oversight with regard to the regulation of financial insti-
tutions. As one participant in the Roundtable put it, “Congress does 
not know how to do oversight that is not aimed at undermining the 
President,” and, so, it did little in the way of regular “vanilla oversight” 
that might have prevented the worst of the abuses that contributed to 
the financial industry meltdown.
Even with its dismal public approval ratings, Congress has shown 
little interest in reforming itself. Many believe the institutional lack of 
interest in reform is rooted in political reality. “Our government,” one 
Roundtable participant observed “is run by politicians whose survival 
depends on reelection, not the good of the whole”—a delicate way, 
perhaps, to state the obvious link between political contributions and 
the desire of current Congressional committee incumbents to retain 
their scope of jurisdiction in order to maintain their positions of power. 
A recent National Academy report on the 2009 Presidential Transition 
at the Department of Homeland Security made it clear that the 
impact of dysfunctional Congressional oversight is not limited to the 
financial sector. Citing the potential policy disarray that results from 
conflicting Congressional direction, the National Academy Panel called 
upon Congress to “Implement the 9/11 Commission recommenda-
tion to reduce the number of [Department of Homeland Security] 
Congressional oversight committees and subcommittees from its  
current unwieldy eighty-seven.” 
Effective oversight was not the only concern raised by the Roundtable 
participants, however. A number expressed concern about the appar-
ent lack of policy expertise in Congress, particularly with respect to 
financial issues. “No policy incubation is going on in Congress,” was 
the view expressed by at least one participant. Some pointed to the 
lack of conditions or objectives attached to the first round of “bailout” 
funding given to banks, while others lamented major legislation that is 
“so detailed that the ability of the Executive Branch to manage it has 
been leached out.” Both of these conditions, it seems, have contributed 
to what was described by one former government official as a “shift of 
power away from the cabinet and government, toward ‘heroic’ leader-
ship from a White House that does not have to respond to Congress.” 
Can Congress reform itself and reassert the balance of power envisioned 
by the nation’s founders in the Constitution?
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Question Five:
Is it time to re-examine the distribution of 
roles, power and authority among federal, 
state, and local governments in light of the 
financial crisis?
“Much that is now federal was established in the past when needs were 
different … when state and local governments were weak.”
— Roundtable Participant
Over the last 30 years, the federal government has incrementally 
redefined the roles and responsibilities of states and localities. One 
Roundtable participant observed, “Almost everything the federal gov-
ernment initiates is actually done by somebody else at some level—
state, local, non-profit, private contractors.” In addition, some now 
argue that states, often with the encouragement of federal demon-
stration projects, have become the engines for innovation engines in 
major policy and program areas like the environment, education and 
health care. Supporters of these developments have called for further 
redefinition. 
The current economic crisis has re-opened issues of federal-state-local 
roles, particularly as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
funds flow through the federal system to state and local governments. 
The $787 billion Act, passed in February 2009, provides about $280 
billion for states and municipalities to spend on infrastructure projects, 
Medicaid, unemployment insurance benefits, green energy project 
and other programs. The law, however, includes stringent oversight 
and reporting requirements, and the Obama administration has given 
every indication that it will require grant recipients to provide a full 
and transparent accounting of both spending and results. 
While the economic crisis has prompted an outpouring of federal funds 
to states and municipalities, some believe this has only heightens the 
need for more federal control and uniformity. As unemployment rises 
and more people lose their employer-based health insurance, questions 
are being raised about the wisdom of having states offer a patchwork 
of health care programs with different eligibility requirements, benefits 
and options, and potentially disparate health outcomes and social 
equity issues. 
Further, the disparate impacts of the recession on state tax bases, 
combined with state requirements for a balanced budget, have also 
created added pressure to compensate for different unemployment, 
health care and other need-based assistance among unemployed and 
low income citizens living in different states. Finally, some argue that 
inconsistent state regulation of financial institutions and the insurance 
industry has contributed to the current economic crisis.
Should Americans reconsider how best to allocate the roles and 
responsibilities among federal, state, and local authorities? 
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Question Six:
How do we strengthen transparency and 
accountability? 
“There is nothing wrong with sub-primes, but they are fundamentally 
different. Had these packages been transparent, they would have been 
packaged differently, with higher risk at higher rates. Lack of perspicacity 
in looking into these loans is a greater problem; consumers have to be 
able to look into the loan packages.”
— Roundtable Participant
There is a strong sense that transparency and accountability mecha-
nisms—both public and private—were grossly inadequate in mitigating 
the financial crisis, in spite of the fact that accountability is high on the 
agenda of many organizations. Not surprisingly, calls for government 
transparency and accountability have gained increased support in the 
context of the public and private failures contributing to the financial 
crisis, as well as the scale of government intervention and spending 
that the crisis has induced. 
While there are a variety of ways to improve accountability and trans-
parency, many observers agree that these mechanisms should: 
•	 Provide incentives for people to do the right things. Current 
accountability systems typically, in the best case, monitor behavior 
against some standard or target, or, at a minimum, require that 
actions and decisions be transparent. For the most part, account-
ability is equated with compliance. Lacking are incentives for 
people to behave well or better.
•	 Discourage people from doing the wrong things. Conversely, there 
are few disincentives to deter people from behaving badly, unless 
a law has been broken or a performance target has not been met. 
What is needed is discouragement of bad behavior.
•	 Create transparency that focuses on values and risks, as well as 
data and information. Since the advent of web 2.0 and related 
technology platforms, providing data and information to stakeholders 
and the public at large is becoming an important tool for harness-
ing “the wisdom of the crowd.” Ensuring that this data—and the 
knowledge it informs—highlights the values and risks associated 
with outputs and outcomes is critical to accountability. 
•	 Distinguish between accountability and transparency. 
Accountability is defined as the assignment of responsibility and 
consequences for actions taken. It should not be treated as the 
equivalent of making data, actions and decisions transparent. 
Transparency is but one mechanism by which people might judge 
the performance of those to be held accountable. Holding them 
accountable is something else.
Can and will the American people insist that the growing emphasis on 




What is the government’s exit strategy from 
various sectors of the economy in which it 
has intervened in response to the financial 
crisis?
“We have gone into this without an exit strategy. The tunnel is longer, 
the problems bigger than anyone expected, and it is not clear what 
will happen except that the world will look much different when we 
exit than when we entered.”
— Roundtable Participant
Since the onset of the financial crisis, the federal government has inter-
vened in unprecedented ways in the economy. In addition to massive 
spending under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the gov-
ernment has taken extraordinary actions through the Federal Reserve 
Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Department 
of the Treasury to stabilize the financial sector and the economy. Along 
the way, it has assumed ownership and control of several large banks, 
an insurance company, two government-sponsored enterprises, and two 
automobile manufacturers. Through these interventions, the federal 
government is exerting extraordinary control and influence on major 
sectors of the economy. 
The federal government will face conflicting pressures to exit and to 
retain control. If it retains control for too long, the commercial viability 
of those and competing companies could be undermined. If it exits 
too soon or too abruptly, it may cause undue economic disruption and 
forego a return on taxpayer dollars. 
Government investments also have the potential to transform the role 
the federal government plays in the private economy more generally. 
While largely intended to be temporary, many fear that they will create 
long-term, almost “permanent” expectations—particularly with regard 
to education, unemployment insurance, infrastructure and tax breaks. 
One challenge confronting the government is to devise exit strategies 
that balance policy objectives, such as minimizing economic disruption 
and securing a return on taxpayer dollars, while not undermining the 
viability of companies receiving aid or their competitors in the market. 
Another challenge is to determine the appropriate scope of ongoing 
federal regulatory authority in light of both practical demands and the 
appropriate role of the federal government in managing the economy.
How can the Administration and Congress reach agreement on—and 
share with the American public—an effective “exit” strategy, while 
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